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Abstract
This paper describes the emerging field of Internet
Economics and some of the constituencies which are
shaping it.  It defines the motivating factors for
looking at this area, reviews some recent research
results, and explores areas of overlapping interest.
The paper concludes with six recommendations for
further work.
1 Introduction
Internet economics is a growing area of concern to
members of the technical, business, academic, and
user communities.  While new applications, new
users, and new connections have spurred on the
Internet to become an important medium for
communication, information dissemination, and
electronic commerce, the economic policies currently
undergirding the Internet may be less extensible.
This paper examines how the different constituencies'
often conflicting and overlapping interests are
beginning to yield to a rough consensus.
In particular, the different constituencies are
beginning to share the recognition that the growth of
the Internet is explained by its economic feature of
positive network externalities, its technical
characteristic of statistical sharing, and its policy
objective of interoperability.  This definition of the
critical features of the Internet as well as other
findings discussed in this paper are partially a result
of the authors' work in organizing an Internet
Economics Workshop (hereinafter referred to as "the
workshop") sponsored by the National Science
Foundation and Advanced Research Projects Agency
[29].  The workshop was held in Cambridge, MA at
MIT on March 9 & 10, 1995.1
2 Motivation
The paper first identifies and characterizes the
                                         
1. The workshop was partially funded by the National
Science Foundation, grant #NCR-9509244, and the
Advanced Research Projects Agency, contract #N00174-
93-C-0036.  Please consult the workshop home page
(http://rpcp.mit.edu/Workshops/cfp.html) for workshop
notes and other  workshop information.
different academic disciplines which have done work
related to Internet economics:  technology, economics,
and policy.  Each of these areas has important
contributions to make to the field but there has been
little consensus across disciplines (or even within
disciplines) on which direction to take.  Figure 1
shows a Venn diagram which tries to characterize the
constituencies' current motivation to look at Internet
economics.
Figure 1:  Constituencies' Objectives
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Figure 1 suggests that these communities do not at
present agree in their views on Internet Economics.
The workshop tried to find the common ground of
these constituencies which is denoted by the "*" in
Figure 1.  First, we identify the "full circle" viewpoint
of each of these constituencies.
2.1 Technical
Traditionally, the technical community hasn't
concerned itself with the economic issues of the
Internet.  The current version of Internet Protocol
version 4 (IPv4) offers users a best-effort service and
it hasn't been necessary to ration a resource.
Agreements between Internet Service Providers (ISPs)
state that they intend to process traffic as quickly as
possible usually on a first-come-first-serve basis.  The
Internet "cloud" is an inherently statistically shared
resource of best-effort service.
When the shared resources of the Internet becomes
congested, users experience additional latency or
delay.  Users have adapted their behavior to
circumvent this latency by using the Internet during
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"off peak" hours for reduced latency.  The possibility
of not experiencing delays has traditionally been
solved by technical solutions such as a priority
queuing method for certain interactive applications
(e.g. telnet).2
Statistical sharing of common facilities has
allowed the infrastructure to grow quickly and
robustly.  Congestion problems experienced in some
links were solved by increasing the bandwidth
between these links.  This method of "over-
provisioning" has worked well in the past but may not
be sufficient to improve the quality of service with
more recent technical developments – namely the
introduction of a new version of the Internet protocol.
Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) promises to
offer multiple qualities of service beyond the current
best-effort service.  If these services are not priced
differently, it is possible there may not be enough of
the shared resource to service each request.  Methods
for rationing or pricing this service are now being
considered by engineers – a possibility that has been
considered by economists for quite some time.
2.2 Economics and the Internet
Perhaps two of the most commonly held
misconceptions about the Internet involve its
economics.  The first is that it is paid for by the
government when, in fact, in 1994 NSF paid for less
than 10% of the Internet cloud.  The second is that the
Internet is free.  MacKie-Mason and Varian detail the
frequently asked questions concerning the economics
of the Internet [20] and the economics for the
infrastructure [23].  We note further that for most
users, the cost of local area networks and computers
far exceeds the costs which can be ascribed
exclusively to Internet connectivity.  Below, we will
briefly analyze the economics of the Internet to
provide context for the remainder of the paper as was
explored during the workshop.
A common good, as defined by economists, is "[a]
resource, such as air and water, to which anyone has
free access."3  Economic theory suggests that the
Internet can also be included as a common good since
the "cloud" is common to all Internet users.
Therefore, the Internet, like the environment, may be
prone to abusive behavior by one of its users leading
to a degradation in that resource.  This has been
characterized as a "tragedy of the commons" by
                                         
2. The NSFnet experienced such congestion over its
56kb/s backbone in 1986 that it did just this.
3. Pyndyck and Rubinfeld, (1995) Microeconomics,
Prentice-Hall, p.670.
Garrett Hardin [16].
Economists have questioned the current practice of
users experiencing latency when the Internet is
congested suggesting that some users may pay more to
circumvent congestion.
The economic community feels that the pricing
structure of the Internet is sub-optimal.  As the
disparity between heavy users and lighter users of the
Internet widen, more equitable and efficient pricing
mechanisms will have to be created to enable self-
sustaining growth of the Internet.  For a better pricing
structure, one that is more economically optimal, we
could imagine a system where the price equals the
marginal cost.  However, costs in an IP network are
totally fixed except for some kind of congestion cost.
All of the cost associated with people, electronics,
leased lines, etc. have been paid for already and are
seen as fixed costs.  The congestion cost means that
w en a user on the Internet sends or receives data,
they are using bandwidth that could otherwise be used
by other users of the network.  It has been argued that
usage based pricing that reflects this congestion cost
would be a more equitable pricing policy [22].
Although this view is disputed across disciplines,
some argue that it is only a matter of time before flat-
fee pricing mechanisms fail as an expected Internet
crunch approaches and congestion costs increase.
Since not all applications demand the same kind of
service out of the Internet, it may be necessary to
prioritize data traffic for lower levels of latency. In
particular, video and voice traffic may need a higher
level of service when Internet congestion is high.
New services are being addressed by the engineering
community (through ATM, IPv6, etc.) and may
require appropriate pricing mechanisms to emerge
with these new services.
On the other hand, there is a powerful economic
incentive to cooperate induced by the significant
positive network externalities associated with being
on the Internet.  Cooperation through statistical
sharing  benefits each individual Internet user and has
been sufficient motivation to date to avoid the worst
case abuses which one could imagine.
The challenge then is not only to develop effective
Internet pricing mechanisms, but to do so without
losi  the benefits of interoperability and positive
n twork externalities currently gained through the
Internet's reliance on statistical sharing.  Achieving
economic efficiency without inciting users to abandon
the Internet's technical approach of statistical sharing,
and hence without abandoning the Internet as such, is
the challenge policy makers, businesses, and the
public must now face.
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2.3 Policy
The U.S. Government's role in the development of
the Internet has changed with the NSFn t transition
plan, but continues to be an important role.  Even
with the privatization of the federally-invested
Internet backbone, the NSFnet, there are other
federally-invested internets (ESnet, NSI, etc.).
As an investor and large user of the Internet, the
U.S. Government is very concerned with the self-
sustaining economic growth of the Internet.  The
mission agencies, such as NASA and the Department
of Energy, operate their own wide area IP network
which interconnects with the Internet.  Therefore, the
government continues to be conscientious of how it
invests in them.  One of the main documents that
outlines this guidance is the Office of Management
and Budgets (OMB) Circular A-130, Management of
Federal Information Resources.  This circular outlines
how federal agencies should coordinate their efforts so
that they may provide Internet services in a cost
effective manner.
Specifically, the government is interested in how it
allocates and recovers costs for Internet services.
OMB Circular A-130 states that the costs for these
information services should be accounted for so that
there will be an equitable sharing of the costs to
provide these network services.  However, A-130
changed in July of 1994 from its original 1985 form
in the area of cost accounting and recovery for federal
networks [28].  While the old circular was very direct
about how to account and recover for costs, the new
circular is more general.  This change was a result of
the difficulty of implementing the recommendations
from the original circular for shared data networks
such as the IP networks federal agencies have.  Other
users of IP networks have had similar difficulties in
developing accounting and cost recovery systems for
IP networks which were considered fair by users.
The Department of Defense (DoD) decided to
implement a usage based cost recovery and pricing
scheme for its inter-agency Internet called the Defense
Data Network, the DDN [5], to implement the
directive of OMB Circular A-130.  The idea was to
charge each of the branches of the military for their
usage of the network to recover the costs.  However, it
became apparent to the different DDN users that it
was difficult to budget money for networks since
usage varied greatly from month-to-month. Instead of
encouraging people to use DDN for their networking
needs, the different branches of the US military
developed their own IP networks which they paid for
in the more traditional flat-fee model.
The Federal Networking Council and its Advisory
Committee, which facilitate information exchange
and action items for federal IP networks, have been
involved with the issue of cost accounting and
recovery.
3 Definitions
Throughout the aforementioned workshop, we
found it difficult for the different constituencies to
agree on the definitions surrounding Internet
Economics.  For example, participants couldn't agree
whether or not the current Internet was characterized
by a "usage-based" pricing system.  It was argued that
people buy leased lines based upon expected usage
thereby leasing a higher bandwidth, more expensive
trunk and, therefore, pay on a usage-based model.  We
do not expect the struggles over the definition of
usage-based pricing to be resolved soon.  Instead, we
use the following definitions to characterize proposals
to price the Internet.
1.  Flat-rate pricing:  Currently, most Internet
users pay a fee to connect while they are not billed for
each bit sent.  For example, a user may pay for a T1
link regardless of how many bits they receive or send.
2.  Usage-sensitive pricing:  Users pay a portion of
their Internet bill for a connection (this price could be
zer , but rarely is) and a portion for each bit sent
and/or received.  The marginal monetary cost of
sending or receiving another bit is non-zero during
some time period.  It is possible, for example, to have
usage-sensitive pricing during peak hours and flat-
rat  during off-peak but we define the overall system
as being usage-sensitive pricing.
3.  Transaction-based pricing:  Like usage-
sensitive pricing, the marginal monetary cost of
sending and/or receiving another bit is non-zero.
However, the prices are determined by the
characteristics of the transaction and not by the
number of bits.
While we realize that these definitions may be
different for different constituencies, these definitions
are roughly agreed upon and necessary to discuss the
research done in this area.
4 Internet Pricing Research
Pricing policies associated with Internet
economics include pricing for congestion control and
interconnection.  Many of the assumptions underlying
the application-specific pricing policies in
telecommunications, such as for telephony, are
difficult and costly to implement for the Internet.
Furthermore, the Internet culture and economics are
